Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

1997

Prometheus Unbound: Fiduciary Obligation in the Supreme Court
of Canada
John D. McCamus
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, jmccamus@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
Canadian Business Law Journal. Volume 28, Issue 1 (1997), p. 104-140.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
McCamus, John D. "Prometheus Unbound: Fiduciary Obligation in the Supreme Court of Canada."
Canadian Business Law Journal 28.1 (1997): 104-140.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
John D. McCamus*
CONTENTS
I. Introd uctio n ................................................................................
............
II. P rom etheus ..............................................................................................
ll. The Definition of Fiduciary Obligation ...................................................
1. The Destabilizing Effect of Remedy ................................................
2. The Centrality of U ndertaking .........................................................
3. The Non-Essential Nature of Other Factors .....................................
4. The La Forest-Sopinka Debate ........................................................
IV. Equitable Compensation and the New Fiduciary Duties .........................
V. Equitable Compensation as Law Reformer .............................................
VI. Toward a Less Expansive Reading ..
.....................
.......................
V II. Co nclusion ...............................................................................................

I.

107
110
116
116
118
122
124
128
131
136
140

INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly interdependent world, or so it is argued,
increased importance is placed on the law of fiduciary obligation.'
The Canadian evidence, certainly, is consistent with this thesis. In
recent years, two Canadian textbooks on fiduciary law have been
published,2 the latter of which currently cites something in the order
of seven or eight hundred reported Canadian judicial decisions. Law3
review articles on the subject abound and at least one law school
offers a course on the subject. This paper attempts, in rather brief
Professor of Law. Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. This is the revised version
of a paper delivered by the author at the 25th Annual Workshop on Commercial and
Consumer Law held on October 20 and 21, 1995. at the Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto.
T. Frankel, "Fiduciary Law" (1983), 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795.
2 J.C. Shepherd. The Law of Fiduciaries (Toronto, Carswell, 1981); M.V. Ellis, Fiduciary
Duties in Canada (Toronto, Carswell, 1988 with looseleaf supplements). The Australian
experience is similar. See P.D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney, Law Book Co.,
1977); J. Glover, Commercial Equity: Fiduciary Relationships (Sydney, Butterworths,
3

1995).
The University of Alberta. An American casebook focusing on fiduciary doctrine provides
teaching materials for a similar course. See D. DeMott, FiduciaryObligation:Agency and
Partnership(St. Paul, Minn., West Pub. Co., 1991).
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compass, to develop an understanding and assessment of the present
and possible future course of the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada on fiduciary law.
It will be useful to begin with a brief sketch of the traditional
law of fiduciary obligation, as it might have been articulated by a
Canadian lawyer in the common law tradition, circa 1975. The
law of fiduciary obligation, it would be said, is an invention of the
English courts of equity which imposes certain duties of loyalty
on individuals who have undertaken, either expressly or impliedly,
to act on another's behalf. The fiduciary duty of loyalty, which
developed by analogy from principles of the law of trust which
impose similar duties on express trustees, is imposed on individuals in a recognized list of categories of relationships such as principal and agent, solicitor and client, executor or administrator and
beneficiary, director or officer and the corporation, promoter and
investor, partners, joint venturers, doctor and patient and parent
and child. Fiduciary relationships may also arise in relationships
that do not come within the prescribed list, provided that, on its
facts, the particular relationship possesses the requisite fiduciary
character.
The nature of the duty imposed on individuals who owe a
fiduciary obligation is normally expressed in two rules or proscriptions, the "profit" rule (to the effect that one who occupies a
fiduciary position must not personally profit by virtue of that
position) and the "conflict" rule (to the effect that one must not
place oneself in a situation where duty to the principal is or may
be seen to be in conflict with the self-interest of the fiduciary). In
other words, one must not make a secret profit by virtue of one's
fiduciary position and one must not engage in self-dealing. "Examination of the activities of fiduciaries involves, above all, an inquiry into the propriety of profit-making". 4 Various types of
impropriety are spelled out in the fiduciary case law. The fiduciary
must not accept a bribe or secret commission, sell his own property
without disclosure of his interest to the principal, and so on. The duty
of fiduciary loyalty thus enjoins a particular kind of exploitation or
profiteering.
It is worth emphasizing, in the present context, that there are
limits to the reach of the traditional fiduciary duty of loyalty. The
scope of a particular fiduciary duty will be determined, typically,
by examining the nature of the fiduciary undertaking. If acting
4 E.J. Weinrib, "The Fiduciary Obligation" (1975), 25 U.T.L.J. I at p. 2.
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outside the scope of that undertaking, the fiduciary is entitled to
act in a self-interested fashion.5 The fiduciary may, of course, be
subject to other kinds of duties. Fiduciaries will often have a contractual relationship with their principal. The duties imposed by the
contract would not necessarily or, indeed, normally be fiduciary in
character. Fiduciary duty and contractual duty may overlap, however, where the agreement itself imposes a duty of loyalty. Fiduciaries are subject to the law of tort. Some types of fiduciary breach
may be tortious. As a general proposition, however, the fiduciary's
duty of loyalty is different in kind from the duties imposed by
contract and tort. Thus, "not every legal claim arising out of a
relationship with fiduciary incidents will give rise to a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty". 6
In the event of a breach of duty, the remedies available to the
victim of the breach have, as their evident purpose, the lifting of
the fiduciary's ill-gotten gains. The faithless fiduciary may be
forced to disgorge profits secured by breach either by the imposition of a constructive trust on those profits or by the remedy of an
accounting. The principal distinction between the two remedies is
that the accounting of profits remedy is merely personal in nature,
whereas the constructive trust may confer proprietary relief by
determining that the defendant holds certain assets secured by the
breach as a constructive trustee on the plaintiff's behalf. Where the
self-dealing involves the transfer of an asset to or from the principal, disgorgement of the ill-gotten gain may be achieved by a
decree of rescission.
Under the traditional account, then, there is an evident symmetry
as one moves from the nature of the duty - loyalty - through
the definition of breach - profiteering and self-dealing - and on

to the remedy - disgorgement of the profits. Our mid-70s lawyer
might not have mentioned that in addition to the foregoing, the
1914 decision of the House of Lords in Nocton v. Ashburton
5 See, generally, P.D. Maddaugh and J.D. McCamus. The Law of Restitution (Aurora, Ont.,
Canada Law Book. 1990). pp. 588-91. And see McLeod v. Sweeze, [1944] S.C.R. Il1,
[1944] 2 DL.R. 145: Tomnbill Gold Mines (Ltd.) i. Hamilton (City), [1956] S.C.R. 858, 5
D.L.R. (2d) 561.
6 Lac Minerals Ltd. t. hIternationalCorona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 at p. 647,
61 D.L.R. (4th) 14. per La Forest J. In Girardet v. Crease & Co. (1987), I1 B.C.L.R. (2d)
361 at p. 362, Southin J. emphasized this point in distinguishing the solicitor's duty to
exercise reasonable skill and care from the duty of loyalty. This passage was quoted
approvingly by both Sopinka and La Forest JJ. in their opinions in the Lac Minerals case,
at pp. 597-98 and 647, respectively.
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(Lord)7 indicated that damages in the form of equitable compensation could be awarded where careless non-disclosure of a conflict
caused economic loss. Nocton had been overtaken by developments
in tort and, in any event, such facts would typically constitute, as
they did in that case, a breach of contract.
II. PROMETHEUS

In December of 1994, the Supreme Court of Canada released its
decision in Hodgkinson v. Simms,8 the latest in a remarkable series
of decisions rendered in the last decade or so in which the Supreme
Court of Canada has devoted considerable attention to the elaboration and development of the law of fiduciary obligations. In Hodgkinson, the plaintiff was a stockbroker who had invested some
portion of his very substantial earnings in real estate investments in
the form of "MURBS". The crash of the real estate market saddled
Hodgkinson with losses in the amount of $350,507.62. Unlucky in
his decision to invest in real estate, Hodgkinson was much luckier
when he retained counsel. His lawyer had the wit to recommend a
claim against Simms, an accountant who was in the business of
providing tax shelter advice and who had recommended to the
plaintiff the particular MURB projects in which he had duly invested.
The theory of the claim was that Simms had breached his fiduciary
duty and thus would be obliged to indemnify Hodgkinson for all
losses he had sustained. The factual foundations for the claimed
breach of fiduciary obligation were that Hodgkinson, who had
sought Simms' advice in the expectation that it would be independently given, was unaware of the fact that Simms had a professional
relationship with the developers of the "MURB" projects in which he
encouraged Hodgkinson to invest. Indeed, Simms' relationship was
such that he enjoyed a "bonus billing" from the developers every
time one of his tax planning clients invested in one of these projects.
On the plaintiff's theory, then, Simms was caught in a classic breach
of fiduciary duty, profiting from a situation in which there was a
conflict between his self-interest and his duty to his client. Hodgkinson was not content to seek a disgorgement of those profits, however, but sought, in addition, indemnification for his losses on the
basis that he would have not invested in the "MURBS" if he had
known of Simms' involvement with the developers. A majority of
7 [1914] A.C. 932.
8 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
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the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with this analysis and awarded
full indemnification of his losses.
In the reasoning of the members of the court in Hodgkinson v.
Simms there are a number of characteristics which are typical of
other decisions in this recent line of authority. First, much attention
was devoted in the opinions to the question of fashioning the
appropriate definition for the concept of "fiduciary relationship".
Writing in 1975, Professor Weinrib observed that the judicial decisions in this field failed to provide an "elucidation of the broader
problems of policy which underline the whole fiduciary concept"
and, more particularly, failed to answer such questions as "[w]hat
is the criterion of the fiduciary?"9 Professor Weinrib was not being
critical of the efforts of the judiciary for, as he noted, "it would be
unrealistic to expect in the hurly-burly ofjudicial activity elaborately
abstract comments about underlying purposes".'I However unrealistic such expectations might have seemed in 1975, it is unquestionably the case that they have been richly fulfilled in this line of cases.
The members of the court have, in fact, conducted a spirited debate
on such questions in these authorities and the debate continues in
the opinions in Hodgkinson itself.
Further, as with the earlier cases, the court in Hodgkinson was
divided with respect to the question of whether the fiduciary criterion was met on the facts of the case at hand. In Guerin v. Canada,"
a majority of the court held that officials in the Indian Affairs Branch
of the federal government who had negotiated, on behalf of the
plaintiff Indian band, a lease of a portion of the band's reserve lands
to a golf club had breached a fiduciary obligation. They had failed
to follow the band's instructions and negotiated the lease with less
favourable terms than those on which the band had insisted. In
Frame v. Smith," the court divided on the question of whether a
former wife who was granted custody of the children of the marriage
owed a fiduciary obligation to the husband to facilitate access to the
children. Although a majority of the court held that the statutorily
authorized access order did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship,
we shall see that the dissenting opinion of Wilson J. to the contrary
effect has proven to be influential in matters of principle.
9 Supra, footnote 4,at p. 1.
IO[bid.,
at p. 2.
"I [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
12 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81.
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In the decision in Lac Minerals,3 the court divided over the
applicability of the fiduciary concept to parties who had entered into
a series of negotiations which were thought to be leading towards a
joint venture of a mining property, during which some confidential
information was disclosed to and exploited by the defendant. In Lac,
the majority opinion written by Sopinka J. held that the relationship
was not fiduciary in the circumstances over a vigorous dissent to the
contrary effect on this point written by La Forest J. These roles
appear to have been reversed, to some extent, in Hodgkinson v.
Simms.
A third feature of these decisions which is also manifest in
Hodgkinson is the willingness on the court's part to develop and
extend the notion that a defendant who has breached a fiduciary
duty may be vulnerable not only to the traditional remedies of
an accounting or a constructive trust, but, either additionally or
alternatively, to an order to pay what are, in effect, damages for
breach of fiduciary duty. Such damages, referred to as "equitable
compensation"' 4 are to be calculated on the basis of equitable principles which yield awards that might appear most impressive to a
humble common lawyer. In Guerin, for example, the plaintiff band
was awarded 10 million dollars in damages on the theory that
equitable damages are "to be determined by analogy with the principles of trust law". The band was therefore entitled to the benefit of
a presumption that, but for the fiduciary breach, it would have
developed the land in the most advantageous way possible, that is
by leasing the land for residential purposes at the height of the
market during the period in question. In Canson Enterprises Ltd.
v. Boughton & Co., 5 the court debated vigorously, if somewhat
inconclusively, whether other principles of trust law might be applicable to the calculation of damages for breach of fiduciary duty at
the expense of such common law inventions as the doctrines of
foreseeability, mitigation, contributory negligence and the like. Fortunately for the defendant solicitor in that case, the court was unanimously of the view that even in equity, a defendant would not be
liable for damage which had no causal link to the fiduciary breach.
The defendant solicitor had breached a fiduciary duty to his client,
the purchaser of a real estate parcel, by failing to disclose that the
13 Supra, footnote 6.
14 See generally, I.E. Davidson, "The Equitable Remedy of Compensation" (1982),

13
Melb. U. Rev. 349; W.M.C. Gummow, "Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty" in
T.G. Youdan, ed., Equity, Fiduciariesand Trusts (Toronto, Carswell, 1989), p. 57.
15 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 129.
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property was being flipped by the vendor to an undisclosed third
party. He was held not liable, however, for the damages that resulted
when a warehouse built on the parcel by the plaintiff sank into the
ground as a result of defective work by the plaintiff's soils engineers
and contractor. There was no causal connection between the loss
and the solicitor's breach of duty.
A fourth aspect of this line of authority, which is not present in
Hodgkinson, is that the court has, on a number of occasions,
developed new types of duties to be imposed on fiduciaries or, one
might say, new types of breach of fiduciary obligation. In the
Guerin case, for example, the failure of the Indian Affairs officials
to follow the band's instructions was held to be a breach of fiduciary loyalty. 6 Neither the officials nor the government were said
to be in a conflict situation or inappropriately profiting from the
transaction. If the Crown had simply been acting for the band as an
agent on a contractual basis - and it is perhaps important in explaining the approach taken in Guerin that this was not so - it seems
rather likely that the breach in question would be characterized as
a simple breach of contract sounding in contractual damages. In
contract, of course, the quantum of damages would doubtless be
substantially less than the 10 million dollars awarded in Guerin.
Guerin suggests, then, that a fiduciary who fails to follow instructions and thereby deprives the principal of an opportunity to profit
may be liable to compensate for that loss of profit on equitable
terms.
The defendant solicitor in Canson v. Boughton, in failing to
disclose to the client purchaser the fact that the property to be
purchased would be flipped, was neither in breach of the conflict
rule nor of the profit rule. Rather, he had engaged in a material
non-disclosure of information which if disclosed, would have led
his client to refuse to go through with the transaction, thus avoiding
substantial losses. In writing for the majority, La Forest J. noted
that "[s]ome academic writings, it is true, argue for limiting fiduciary obligations to situations where the solicitor may benefit from
a misstatement". 7 Such views, for La Forest J. "may to some extent
rest on, in my view, a misguided sense of orderliness".,8
Supra, footnote 11.
Supra, footnote 15, at p. 573.
Is Ibid., referring to the paper of the Honourable Mr. Justice Gummow referred to at
footnote 14, supra. See also, in the same volume, P. Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" at
p. 1 and especially at pp. 28-30.
16
17

114

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 28

Two decisions of the court lead to the conclusion, which some
may find surprising, that a sexual assault constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty. In the first, Norberg v. Wynrib,"9 a majority of the
court concluded that a physician who had traded prescriptions for a
drug to which his plaintiff client was addicted in exchange for sexual
favours had committed a battery and was liable for both general and
punitive damages in tort. In a concurring opinion, McLachlin J.
indicated that "the doctrines of tort or contract [do not] capture the
essential nature of the wrong done to the plaintiff."20 Rather, in her
view, "[o]nly the principles applicable to fiduciary relationships and
their breach encompass it in its totality". 2 The physician was under
a fiduciary duty to act in the patient's best interest and "not permit
any conflict between his duty to act only in her best interests and his
own interests - including his interest in sexual gratification".22
McLachlin J. acknowledged that the interests of the plaintiff being
protected by this application of fiduciary theory were "different
from the legal and economic interests which the law of fiduciary
relationships has traditionally been used to safeguard".23 Nonetheless, as Wilson J. observed in Frame v. Smith,24 "[t]o deny relief
because of the nature of the interest involved, to afford protection to
material interests but not to human or personal interests would, it
seems to me, be arbitrary in the extreme". McLachlin J. would have
awarded damages on a somewhat higher scale than the majority. In
the second case, M. (K.) v. M. (H.),25 a majority of the court adopted
the view that incest committed by the defendant father constituted
both the tort of assault and a breach of the fiduciary relationship
between parent and child. In these two cases, we may note in
passing, the court pioneered the notion of punitive damages in
equity."
19 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, 92 D.L.R. (4th) 229. For comment, see T. Allen, "Civil Liability for
Sexual Exploitation in Professional Relationships" (1996), 59 Mod. L. Rev. 56.
20 Ibid.,
at pp. 268-69.
21 Ibid.,
at p. 269.
22 Ibid., at p. 275.
23 Ibid.,
at p. 277.
24 Stipra, footnote 12, at p. 143.
25 [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289.
26 It is not entirely clear that the court was aware of the controversial nature of this
proposition. Though there are authorities in either direction, the Ontario Law Reform
Commission in its Report on Exemplary Damages (Toronto, 1991) at pp. 71-74, recommended the extension of punitive relief to equity cases (over the dissent of Commissioner
Earl A. Cherniak, Q.C.), having assumed that they were not clearly available under
current Canadian law.
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Finally, in Mclnerney v. MacDonald,7 the court held that failure
by the defendant physician to disclose copies of the contents of the
plaintiff patient's complete medical file constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. The defendant had been willing to disclose copies of
all notes, memoranda and reports that she had herself prepared but
refused to produce copies of consultants' reports and other records
she had received from other physicians, suggesting to the plaintiff
that she might contact the authors of those documents for release of
the records in question. This was held to constitute a breach of the
fiduciary duty owed by a physician in such circumstances to disclose
the contents of the file. The patient was therefore entitled to the
remedy of an order that disclosure be made, though the court retained the discretion to refuse to order disclosure in any case where
disclosure of the information contained in the records would create
"a real potential for harm either to the patient or to a third party". 8
Interestingly, then, in virtually every case in this line of authority
other than Hodgkinson, the breach of fiduciary duty in question
was a breach of something other than either the conflict rule or
the profit rule. Further, in each case, including Hodgkinson, the
remedies either granted or suggested as being available for breach
of fiduciary duty are neither constructive trust nor an accounting
of profits.
From materials such as these, one can obviously fashion an
account which suggests that the court has taken a rather expansive
view of the role of fiduciary obligation in our private, and indeed,
public law. Hence, the title of this article. Indeed, it is not too much
to suggest that if some of the propositions advanced in these cases
are taken to their logical conclusion, fiduciary obligation could
swallow whole much of the law of torts and a considerable portion
of contractual obligation. The burden of this paper is to attempt to
take the measure of these developments and, further, to suggest
that not only is it possible to draw a less expansive vision for the
role of fiduciary obligation from these authorities but that it is
desirable to do so for a variety of reasons. The principal, though
not exclusive, focus will be on what might be referred to as
the commercial cases and the interaction of fiduciary duty with
contractual and tortious liability.
27 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 415. Cf. Breen v. Williams (1996), 70A.L.J.R. 772
(Aust. H.C.).
28 Ibid., atp. 157.
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THE DEFINITION OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION

The central question of interest relating to the definition of
fiduciary obligation, of course, relates to the criterion for recognizing the existence of a fiduciary relationship which falls outside the
established categories. In most of the cases in this line of authority,
the relationship between the parties came within one of the categories on the established list. In Guerin, Frame v. Smith, Lac Minerals and Hodgkinson, however, the relationship between the parties
did not do so and it became necessary for the court to work
within the open-textured category. In the latter two cases, the court
divided in an interesting fashion with Sopinka J. writing for the
majority in Lac and joined in dissent by McLachlin J. in Hodgkinson and with La Forest J. dissenting on this point in Lac but writing
for the plurality of the majority in the Hodgkinson case. 29 A full
treatment of the definition question and an exhaustive treatment of
each of the opinions written by members of the court on this point
is beyond the scope of the present article, which will focus instead
on four points. First, it will be useful for other purposes in this
article to note the possibility that remedial concerns may have a
destabilizing influence on matters of definition. Second, the centrality in the definition of a fiduciary relationship of the existence of
an undertaking to act on behalf of another may usefully be emphasized. Third, I wish to suggest that the choice of any other criterion
as an indispensable talisman for the existence of a fiduciary relationship appears to be unfruitful. Finally, I wish to briefly comment on
what appears to be the current status of what might be referred to as
the La Forest/Sopinka debate.
1.

The Destabilizing Effect of Remedy

In addition to the recognized list of categories of fiduciary
relationship and relationships which, on their facts, have the requisite fiduciary character, readers of the law reports well understand
that there exists an additional group of what might be referred to
as "fictitious" fiduciary relationships. These are relationships
which are recognized by the courts as fiduciary in order to provide
a doctrinal device for imposing a constructive trust remedy in
29 In Hodgkinson, L'Heureux-Dub

and Gonthier JJ. concurred with La Forest J. Major J.
concurred with the dissenting opinion of Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. lacobucci J. wrote a
concurring opinion to form the majority agreeing as to the existence of fiduciary relationship and quantum of damages but apparently differing to some extent with the reasoning
of La Forest J. in noting that Lac should simply be distinguished on its facts.
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order to achieve a just result. The high water mark of this form of
ingenuity is often said to be the English decision in Chase Manhattan Bank N.A. v. Israel-BritishBank (London) Ltd.30 In that case,
the plaintiff bank paid in excess of 2 million dollars U.S. to the
defendant bank in error for a second time. Before the plaintiff bank
took steps to recover the payment, the defendant became insolvent.
The plaintiff was clearly entitled to recover the moneys paid under
a mistake of fact in quasi-contract or, as it might now be called, a
restitutionary or unjust enrichment claim. Under the traditional English doctrine, the remedy in such a case, however, would operate
only in personam. For obvious reasons, the plaintiff preferred relief
in rem and sought to impose a constructive trust on the moneys paid.
The court obliged by finding that the defendant's refusal to return
the money constituted a breach of fiduciary obligation. The fiduciary
relationship in such cases is simply a fiction resorted to by the court
in order to impose the constructive trust and enable the plaintiff to
remove this windfall from the bankrupt's estate.
There are numerous examples of Canadian courts using the
fiduciary concept in this instrumental way." The fiction is required,
of course, only if one assumes that it is necessary to establish a
fiduciary relationship in order to impose a constructive trust. This
analytical move became no longer necessary in Canadian common
law, however, once the remedial nature of the constructive trust as a
remedy for unjust enrichment was recognized by the Supreme Court
of Canada.3 2 The important point for present purposes is that in the
absence of such a modification of the doctrine, the understandable
judicial desire to effect just results in particular cases may have a
distorting effect on the fashioning of the fiduciary concept. This
point was acknowledged by La Forest J. in the Lac Minerals case
where this use of the term was said to be one which "gives a
misleading colouration to the fiduciary concept".33 When used in
this fashion, "the label fiduciary imposes no obligations, but rather
is merely instrumental or facilitative in achieving what appears to
be the appropriate result".' The use of the term fiduciary, "used as
a conclusion to justify a result, reads equity backwards. It is a misuse
30 [1981] Ch. 105.
31 See, for example, the authorities discussed in P.D. Maddaugh and J.D. McCamus, The
Law of Restitution (Aurora, Canada Law Book, 1990), pp. 135-39.
32 Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257. See generally, Maddaugh

and McCamus, ibid., at pp. 87-93.
33 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 649.
34 Ibid.
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of the term. It will only be eliminated, however, if the courts give
explicit recognition to the existence of a range of remedies, includbasis even though
ing the constructive trust, available on a principled
35
relationship.
fiduciary
a
of
context
the
outside
If La Forest J.'s views on this point are adopted, as indeed they
should be, the Chase ManhattanBank problem should be made to
disappear from Canadian law. A Canadian court minded to impose
constructive trust relief on the recipient of a mistaken payment
would not need to resort to the fiction of fiduciary relationship but
would, rather, simply impose the constructive trust as a restitutionary remedial device.
The point of relevance to the present discussion, however, is a
broader one. Our experience with the marriage of constructive
trust to fiduciary relationship demonstrates the distorting effect
that remedial concerns may have on the definition of the substantive right. Artificial restriction of a remedy to a particular category
will create pressure to expand the category. Expansion may lead,
as it appeared to here, to incoherence. It may be that, conversely,
attaching an unattractive remedy to a substantive right may create
pressure for its contraction. This may also lead to incoherence.
This is a point to which I will return.
2.

The Centrality of Undertaking

Discussions of the nature of fiduciary obligation, both in the
secondary literature and in judicial opinions, are inclined to begin
with a statement to the effect that a fiduciary is an individual who
has undertaken to act in the interests of another.36The following
statement of Professor A.W. Scott is often quoted:
A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interests of another
person. It is immaterial whether the undertaking is in the form of a contract.
It is immaterial that the undertaking is gratuitous.

Under its traditional formulation, then, the law of fiduciary obligation merely requires the fiduciary to carry out that undertaking.
Failure to do so by allowing self-interest to intervene will be met
by the disgorgement remedies. When it is said, as it often is, that
fiduciary relationships will not commonly arise in the context of
arm's-length commercial dealings, it is obvious why this would
be so. People in such relationships do not normally understand
themselves to be acting on behalf of each other. They may profit
35 Ibid.,
36 A.W.

at p. 652.
Scott, "The Fiduciary Principle" (1949), 37 Cal. L. Rev. 539 at p. 540.
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at each other's expense without committing a breach of fiduciary
obligation. The existence of an undertaking to act on behalf of
another, however, provides a foundation for the imposition of the
duty to so act on the fiduciary and the vindication of the principal's
expectation of loyalty.3" This is not to say, of course, that it would
be inconceivable to live in a world in which fiduciary-type duties
were imposed in the absence of an undertaking to act on behalf of
another. It is only to suggest that some other policy foundation
would need to be established for the imposition of the obligation
and that the theoretical basis for doing so would be something other
than that underpinning traditional fiduciary doctrine.
In the recent Supreme Court cases there was initially some
evidence that the definition of fiduciary obligation was to be cut
adrift from its foundation in undertakings of this kind. In an influential statement in the dissenting opinion
in Frame v. Smith,38
39
Wilson J. offered the following guidance:
[T]here are common features discernible in the contexts in which fiduciary
duties have been found to exist and these common features do provide a rough
and ready guide to whether or not the imposition of a fiduciary obligation on
a new relationship would be appropriate and consistent.
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to
possess three general characteristics:
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to
affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests.
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary
holding the discretion or power.

It may well be that the absence of an element in this definition
requiring an undertaking to act on behalf of another plays some
part in the explanation for Wilson J.'s view, in this case, that a
custodial parent is subject to a fiduciary obligation to facilitate
access by the estranged non-custodial parent. Such parties would
perhaps typically view themselves as adversaries rather than as
individuals acting on each other's behalf. The duty that Wilson J.
would have imposed is thus not fiduciary in the usual sense of the
This is not to suggest that lack of subjective intent to so act is or should be a defence to a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. It is sufficient that the fiduciary is doing a task or
providing a service for the other that reasonably gives rise to the expectation. Cf. L.
Smith, "Fiduciary Relationships - Arising in Commercial Contexts - Investment
Advisors: Hodgkinson v, Simms" (1995), 74 Can. Bar. Rev. 714, especially at pp. 721-24.
38 Supra, footnote 12.
39 Ibid., at p. 136.
37
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term, but, rather, a duty being imposed to vindicate a particular
policy within the realm of family law.
Although the majority in Frame v. Smith were of the view that
the statutory family law scheme was comprehensive and therefore
should not be supplemented by the creation of a civil action either
in tort or in fiduciary obligation, the influence of the definition of
fiduciary obligation offered by Wilson J. has extended into the
subsequent cases. Thus in Lac Minerals both Sopinka J. who wrote
for the majority on this point and La Forest J. quoted this passage
from Wilson J.'s opinion in Frame v. Smith as a jumping off point
for their discussion of the criterion for recognizing the existence
of a fiduciary relationship. It will be recalled that in the Lac case,
Lac and Corona had begun discussions with a view to entering
into a joint venture to develop a mining project owned by Corona.
In the course of those discussions, confidential information concerning mineralization was disclosed by Corona to Lac and the
latter purchased options on neighbouring properties on which Lac
subsequently developed a remarkably prosperous mining venture.
Although both Sopinka and La Forest JJ. noted that fiduciary
relationships will normally not arise in the context of arm's-length
commercial dealing, they differed on whether such a relationship
could arise in the context of these facts. For Sopinka J., the mere
disclosure of confidential information would give rise to a duty of
confidence but could not, in itself, elevate a relationship between
two parties bargaining towards an agreement into a relationship
having a fiduciary character. For La Forest J., however, the disclosure of confidential information in the course of negotiations appeared to play a critical role in establishing that a relationship of
"trust and confidence"4 had been created. This factor, together with
the evidence of the president of Lac - to the effect that once
confidential information had been disclosed in such circumstances,
the industry expectation would be that the recipient would not exploit it to the disadvantage of the discloser4 - gave the relationship
between the parties the necessary fiduciary character. La Forest J.
also agreed with Sopinka J. that once the confidential information
has been disclosed, a duty of confidence would arise which had also
been breached in this case.
One can only speculate as to whether the absence of an emphasis
on the existence of an undertaking to act on behalf of another in
40 Supra, footnote 6, at pp. 656-59.
41 Ibid., at p. 659.
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the definition authored by Wilson J. was of some influence in
enabling La Forest J. to come to the conclusion that parties negotiating towards a joint venture may acquire a fiduciary relationship
through the disclosure of confidential information. It does seem
unlikely, as a practical matter, that negotiating parties would view
themselves as acting on each other's behalf. Again, it is clear
that the disclosure created the duty not to breach or exploit the
confidence. Many may find persuasive, however, the majority
view that the relationship was in other respects an arm's-length
commercial relationship. Indeed, a rule which too easily converted
disclosure of confidential information in the midst of negotiations
into a fiduciary relationship might unattractively create opportunities for strategic behaviour by bargainers.
In the more recent decision in Hodgkinson,42 however, La Forest
J. placed considerable emphasis on the importance of finding an
undertaking to act on behalf of another in establishing the existence
of a fiduciary relationship and, further, appeared to confine the
influence of Wilson J.'s definition of fiduciary duty to an explanatory role relating to the determination of particular classes of relationship as being fiduciary in nature. Thus, having paraphrased
Wilson J.'s definition and having drawn a distinction between fiduciary relationships which come within the recognized classes of
fiduciary relationship (such as "trustee-beneficiary and agent-principal")43 and those which arise on the particular facts of a relationship
which falls outside those classes, La Forest J. went on to observe
that "[i]n seeking to determine whether new classes of relationships
are per se fiduciary, Wilson J.'s three-step analysis is a useful
guide."' However, La Forest J. further observed that the three-step
analysis "encounters difficulties" in identifying fiduciary relationships which "arise as a matter of fact out of the specific circumstances of that particular relationship"." La Forest J. then identified
the critical question to be addressed in such cases in the following
terns :46
In these cases, the question to ask is whether, given all the surrounding
circumstances, one party could reasonably have expected that the other party
would act in the former's best interests with respect to the subject matter in
42

Supra, footnote 8.

43 Ibid., at p. 409.
44 Ibid.
45

Ibid., at p. 409. This restriction of the validity of Wilson J.'sapproach to category

recognition rather than individual fiduciary relationship recognition may well be implicit
46

in La Forest J.'s
opinion in Lac. See, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 647-48.
Hodgkinson, ibid., at pp. 409-10.
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issue... [t]hus, outside the established categories, what is required is evidence
of a mutual understanding that one party has relinquished its own self-interest
and agreed to act solely on behalf of the other party.

If the combined effect of Wilson J.'s opinion in Frame v. Smith
and La Forest J.'s proposed holding in Lac Minerals, then, was to
leave open the impression that the finding of an undertaking to act
on behalf of another was less than central to the definition of
fiduciary obligation favoured by La Forest J., any such concern
has been laid to rest by the opinion in Hodgkinson. The starting
point for the identification of fiduciary obligation, then, must be
to find the existence of such an undertaking. On the facts of
Hodgkinson, that undertaking was found in Simms' retainer to
provide Hodgkinson with investment advice, in circumstances
where Simms, on his own evidence, understood that Hodgkinson
expected that advice to be given in a disinterested manner.
3.

The Non-Essential Nature of Other Factors

In addition to the threshold finding of an undertaking to act in
the other's interest, many jurists and authors, including the members of the Supreme Court of Canada who have written opinions
in the cases under review, have attempted to identify other factors
that are of assistance in reaching the conclusion that a fiduciary
relationship arises on a particular set of facts. In Hodgkinson, La
Forest J. for example mentioned discretion, influence, vulnerability and trust "as non-exhaustive examples of evidential factors
to be considered in making this determination".4 7 Where, as in
Hodgkinson, the defendant is a professional, "the rules set by the
relevant professional body are of guiding importance in determining
the nature of the duties flowing from a particular professional relationship". 8 In Lac, La Forest J. identified such factors as trust and
confidence, industry practice and vulnerability as relevant considerations.49 Professor Finn's list includes "ascendency, influence, vulnerability, trust, confidence and dependence"." Others have
suggested the relevance of the fact that the position held is one that
involves the holding of property of the other or facilitates profittaking.5 Although such suggestions are normally coupled with an
47
48

49
50
51

Ibid., at p. 409.
Ibid., at p. 425.
Supra, footnote 6, at p. 656.
P.D. Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in T.G. Youdan, ed., Equi
(Toronto, Carswell, 1989) at p. 46.
Maddaugh and McCamus, supra, footnote 31, at pp. 577-78.
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indication that no particular factor is essential to a finding of fiduciary relationship, there is often a detectable preference for a particular factor either stated or indicated less directly in such discussions.
Indications of this kind are found in a number of the recent opinions.
Thus, in Frame v. Smith Wilson J. emphasized the importance of
"discretion", that is, a discretion to act unilaterally at the expense of
a vulnerable principal.5 2 In Lac, Sopinka J. emphasized the importance of "dependency or vulnerability" which was, he said, the
"vital ingredient [which] was virtually lacking in this case".5 3 In
Hodgkinson v. Simms, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. emphasized the
importance of "reliance and dependency on the fiduciary by the
beneficiary" which, they said, must be "total".5 4 So varied are the
types of relationships and types of circumstances in which fiduciary
relationship will arise, however, it appears unlikely that an attempt
to give pride of place to any particular factor or factors will be
fruitful.
It is possible, for example, to exaggerate the importance of
"discretion" in the identification of fiduciary relationships. Many
fiduciaries, surely, will carry out tasks that may involve very little
discretionary power, but may nonetheless be subject to a fiduciary
obligation. The fact that a sales agent might enjoy very little room
for manoeuvre would not make the taking of a bribe or other secret
profit less than a fiduciary breach. Fletcher Moulton L.J.'s famous
example of the errand boy55 suggests a fiduciary who may possess
virtually no discretion, but nonetheless have a fiduciary obligation
relating to the change. So too, if "vulnerability" is defined as requiring personal frailty or inequality of bargaining power, as appeared
to have been the view of the majority in Lac, there will certainly be
many fiduciary relationships in which such a power imbalance is
not present. The relationship between director and corporation offers
but one illustration.
Similarly, in the context of relationships that involve the giving
of professional advice, it would appear most unlikely that fiduciary
duties would cease if the person receiving the advice sought a
second opinion or assessed the advice carefully, even if, in such
circumstance, it could hardly be said the reliance being placed on
the advice was "total". One might still be entitled to disinterested
52 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 136.
53 Supra, footnote 6, at p. 606.
54 Supra. footnote 8, at p. 467.
55 Coomber (Re), [19111 1 Ch. 723 (C.A.) at p. 728, quoted with approval in Lac, supra,
footnote 6, at p. 670 per La Forest J.
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advice even if the advice is accepted carefully and reflectively. In
Hodgkinson, as has been indicated, Sopinka and McLachlin JJ.
were of the view that, given the spectrum of possible reliance
from total independence to total reliance, "the law has imposed a
fiduciary obligation only at the extreme of total reliance". 6 The
plurality view, however, was that the degree of reliance was an
important factor to consider in the context of a relationship of an
advisory nature, but that "reliance in this context does not require a
wholesale substitution of decision-making power from the investor
to the advisor"." On cross-examination, Simms conceded that Hodgkinson was looking to him for "'advice which was not directed
towards protecting [his] personal interests but was directed exclusively to protecting [Hodgkinson's interest]"'. 58 In such circumstances, the finding of a fiduciary relationship appears amply
justified even if the reliance placed on that advice could not said to
be total or absolute.
As a matter of authority - and with the possible exception of
Lac, to which we must presently return - there does not appear
to be much support in these recent cases for the identification of a
critical factor or a combination of factors that must invariably be
present in addition to the undertaking to act on another's behalf. No
doubt, individual judges will weigh particular factors in different
contexts in different ways, but these authorities do not depart in an
authoritative way from the traditional view that these are matters
of evidence which may, to varying degrees, be helpful in making
a finding that "one party could reasonably have expected that the
other party would act in the former's best interest with respect to
the subject matter at issue".59
4.

The La Forest-Sopinka Debate

The recurrence of a strong division of opinion between La
Forest J. and Sopinka J. in Hodgkinson, so soon after Lac, with
Sopinka J.'s views prevailing in Lac and those of La Forest J.
occupying the plurality in Hodgkinson, may invite speculation that
the balance of opinion in the court, on some rather important point
relating to fiduciary law, has now shifted from the views of the
majority in Lac in favour of the approach taken by La Forest J.
56
57
58
59

Supra, footnote 8, at p. 468.
Ibid., at p. 432.
Ibid., at p. 429.
Ibid., at p. 409.
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Alternatively, the failure of La Forest J. to attract a clear majority
to his reasons in Hodgkinson may be thought to carry with it the
persistence, on an important question of principle, of the majority
opinion in Lac. Certainly, it is possible to read the opinions in
Hodgkinson itself in support of such views.
My own view, however, is that the result of the exchange in
Hodgkinson is that there is now very little evidence of a strong
disagreement between two factions of the court on any important
question of principle relating to the definition of fiduciary relationship. Apart from the question briefly alluded to above, the question
of just how much reliance must be placed on a professional adviser
in order to attract fiduciary status, there does not appear to be any
significant difference on a matter of principle between the two
factions. Indeed, their views also appear to be quite orthodox. Both
agree on the centrality of undertaking. Both agree, in general
terms, on the factors to be taken into account in finding a fiduciary
relationship. Even on the reliance point, there appears to be very
little difference in principle separating the two approaches. It was
La Forest J.'s view that reliance in the advisory context needed to
be "such that the respondent's advice was in substance an exercise
of a power or discretion reposed in him by the appellant". ° The
fact that Simms conceded that Hodgkinson trusted him and was
looking to him for independent and loyal advice was sufficient
from La Forest J.'s perspective to warrant the finding of fiduciary
relationship. For Sopinka and McLachlin JJ., the question to be
addressed was whether, in the particular relationship there has been
a "ceding by one party of effective power to the other".6" What is
common to both positions, apparently, is that for a professional
adviser who does not come within the established list of fiduciary
relationships to attract a fiduciary obligation, the client's reliance on
that advice must be very substantial.
The other potential candidate for an important difference in
principle would be the concept of "vulnerability". In Lac, La
Forest and Sopinka JJ. took rather different approaches to the
factor of "vulnerability". For La Forest J. vulnerability was to be
interpreted simply as a requirement that the alleged fiduciary be
shown to be in a position to inflict harm or injury on the person to
whom the duty is owed. As has been mentioned, the approach
taken by Sopinka J. appeared to interpret this requirement as one
60 Ibid, at p. 432.
61 Ibid., at p. 466.
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to be evidenced by some kind of "physical and psychological
dependency'".6

La Forest J.'s view of vulnerability appears to point to a factor
inherent in any situation in which one person undertakes to act on
behalf of another. While this gives it the virtue of universality, it
does not appear to add much to the requirement that such an
undertaking exist. Sopinka J.'s narrower view of vulnerability is
plainly something other than the mere fact of undertaking. The
difficulty with this view, however, is that it does not appear to be
an indispensable prerequisite to a finding of fiduciary relationship.
In Hodgkinson, however, this difference of approach appears to
vanish. Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. observed that "[v]ulnerability
does not mean merely 'weak' or 'weaker'. It connotes a relationship of dependency, an 'implicit dependency' by the beneficiary
on the fiduciary ...

a relationship where one party has ceded

power to the other and is, hence, literally 'at the mercy' of the
other". 63 Again, if vulnerability is for Sopinka and McLachlin JJ.
inherent in empowering another to act on one's behalf, the difference
in principle between the two approaches seems very slight indeed.
It is true, of course, that in both Lac and Hodgkinson, Sopinka
J. was of the view that no fiduciary obligation should be found to
exist and La Forest J. came to the opposite conclusion. It is perhaps
less surprising that the court divided on the difficult facts of the
Lac Minerals case, where the facts were arguably beyond but
perhaps tantalizing close to the range of situations in which fiduciary obligations have been found in the past. The difference
in conclusions seems more remarkable in Hodgkinson, however,
where the defendant is a professional investment adviser, who
well appreciates that he has been looked to and relied upon for
independent and selfless advice. Such facts would appear to come
comfortably within the range of fact situations in which fiduciary
obligation will be found. One is drawn, therefore, to speculate as
to the reasons why the minority in Hodgkinson was reluctant to
find a fiduciary obligation. A strong hint, I would suggest, is to be
found in the following passage from the dissenting opinion:6'
Phrases like 'unilateral exercise of power', 'at the mercy of the other's
discretion' and 'has given over that power' suggest a total reliance and
dependence on the fiduciary by the beneficiary. In our view, these phrases are

62 Supra, footnote
63 Supra, footnote
64 Ibid. (emphasis

6, at p. 606.
8, at p. 467.
added).
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not empty verbiage. The courts and writers have used them advisedly, concerned for the need for clarity and aware of the draconian consequences of
the imposition of fiduciary obligation.

In Hodgkinson, it will be recalled, the plaintiff sought full indemnification for his losses in the real estate market relying, in
part, on the theory that equitable compensation for breach of
fiduciary obligation would yield such relief unconstrained by rules
that might be relevant to the calculation of damages for breach
of contract. Although La Forest J. was of the view that such
compensation was available either on the basis of principles of
equitable compensation, or on the basis of contractual doctrine,
Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. were of the view that such relief would
not be available in contract for two reasons. First, in order to
recover damages of this kind for breach of contract, it would be
necessary to establish that the non-disclosure of Simm's interest
had caused the loss. This was not the case, in their view. The loss
resulted from an economic downturn rather than from the failure to
65
make full disclosure. Second, the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale
prevented recovery of losses of this kind which the parties would
not have reasonably contemplated "as liable to result from the respondent's breach of his duty to make full disclosure".66 For Sopinka
and McLachlin JJ., then, a finding of fiduciary obligation would
carry with it the prospects of a damage award well beyond that
available for breach of contract and would provide the plaintiff with
insurance against losses in the real estate market for which he had
not bargained.
If I have correctly diagnosed the source of the minority's reluctance to find a fiduciary obligation, two further observations are
appropriate. First, this may be a live example of the phenomenon
referred to earlier - the distorting effect of remedial concerns on
the definition of the substantive right. One may wonder whether
Sopinka and McLachlin JJ. would have been so reluctant to find
the existence of a fiduciary relationship if the only consequence of
doing so was to strip the defendant Simms of the secret profits
made upon the sale of the MURBS to Hodgkinson. It may well be
that the damage awards for breach of fiduciary duty developed by
this line of cases may inspire some judges, at least, to give a rather
narrow reading to the doctrine of fiduciary obligation. If this is so,
it may be suggested that the more expansive remedies for fiduciary
65 (1854), 9 Ex. 341.
66 Supra, footnote 8, at p. 478.
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obligation envisaged by these recent authorities should be considered a rather mixed blessing.
IV.

EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND THE NEW FIDUCIARY
DUTIES

Earlier, I suggested that the new Supreme Court jurisprudence
on fiduciary obligation, if carried to its logical conclusion, could
absorb substantial portions of the law of tort and contract. It is
time to make that charge stick, if it can be done, before turning to
a consideration of its implications. In support of this proposition,
attention must be drawn to two of the developments briefly alluded
to in the opening section of this paper. Both of these developments
involve substantial extensions of the doctrine of Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord)6" and it will be helpful, therefore, to provide a brief
account of this old chestnut.
Keeping in mind that the traditional remedies for a breach of
the fiduciary duties to avoid conflict and refrain from profiting are
the constructive trust and an accounting, it is to Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord) that one must turn to find evidence of a jurisdiction to
award monetary compensation for breach of fiduciary duty. Nocton
was a solicitor who had retained an interest in property sold to a
builder. His client, Lord Ashburton, had advanced moneys on a
first mortgage on the same property given by the builder. Nocton,
carelessly it was thought, advised his client to release a portion of
the client's interest in the land with the result that Nocton's own
interest was advanced. Upon the builder's default on the mortgage,
the security proved inadequate and Lord Ashburton sought compensation from Nocton on three grounds, two of which failed.
Lord Ashburton's claim in deceit was dismissed because Nocton's
misconduct failed to meet the fraud threshold set out by the House
of Lords a few decades before in Derry v. Peek.6" Tortious liability
for negligent statement, of course, had not yet been invented. Lord
Ashburton's claim for damages for breach of contract flowing from
Nocton's failure to exercise reasonable professional skill and care
was held to be statute-barred. The third claim, which enjoyed success, arose from Nocton's breach of fiduciary duty in failing to
disclose his conflict. Lord Ashburton was awarded equitable compensation or damages for the loss resulting from the breach.
67
68

Supra, footnote 7.
(1989), 14 App. Cas. 337.
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In the recent cases, the Supreme Court has made available
equitable compensation of this kind with respect to a new range of
fiduciary duties which fall outside the traditional fiduciary duty of
loyalty. The first extension has been to award equitable compensation for injuries resulting from a failure to perform an undertaking.
Thus, in Guerin,69 the fiduciary breach involved a failure to follow
the principal's instructions with respect to the negotiation of a lease.
7 ° the fiduciary breach consisted of the defendant soliciIn Canson,
tor's failure to provide full and complete information with respect
to the nature of the transaction his client was entering. There is no
suggestion in either case, then, of a conflict of interest, or an improper profit-taking. The fiduciary breach in Canson would also
appear to be a breach of the solicitor's contractual obligation to
provide service at a reasonable professional standard.7 In another
factual setting, the breach in Guerin would also likely be caught in
a contractual net.
The second extension anticipated in Norberg72 and adopted by
the majority of the court in M. (K.) v. M. (H.)7 3 was to recognize that
equitable compensation could be available to vindicate interests
other than the economic interests protected by traditional fiduciary
law. In her dissenting opinion in Frame v. Smith, Wilson J. suggested
that fiduciary duties should not be considered to be confined to what
she referred to as the "legal interests" of the beneficiary but should
be extended to protect the "vital non-legal or 'practical' interests"."
As authority for this proposition Wilson J. relied upon the wellknown decision in Reading v. The Attorney Generaf 5 in which the
Crown was able to recover the ill-gotten gains of a non-commissioned officer who used his leisure time to display himself in uniform on lorries being driven through Cairo by various individuals
who were prepared to pay him for the privilege of his company. The
Crown's claim for the improperly obtained moneys has a traditional
69 Supra, footnote 11.
70 Supra, footnote 15.
71 Cf. the remarks of Southin J. in Girardet v Crease & Co. referred to supra, footnote 6.
Also see Mortgage Express Ltd. v Bowerman & Partners, [1996] 2 All E.R. 836 (C.A.);
Mothew v. Bristol & West Building Society (unreported, July 24, 1996, Eng. C.A.)
(liability for professional negligence on facts similar to Canson). In Canson itself, the
plaintiff ultimately recovered the difference between the contract price and the market
value of the property, with interest, as damages for breach of fiduciary duty: see Canson
Enterprises : Boughton & Co., [1996] 1 W.W.R. 412, 11 B.C.L.R. (3d) 262 (C.A.).
72 Stpra. footnote 19.
73 Supra, footnote 25.

74 Supra, footnote 12, at p. 136.
75 [1951] A.C. 507 (H.L.).
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fiduciary appearance, but it might be said that the real interest of the
Crown is reputational or diplomatic. Further, it was suggested that
even in the context of more traditional fiduciary relationships such
as that between director and corporation, the interest of the corporation in faithful performance is not merely economic in nature but
might extend to reputational and other practical interests. Thus pried
loose from the protection of more coldly economic interests, Wilson
J. would have extended the protection of fiduciary law to the interest
of a non-custodial parent in gaining proper access to the children of
the marriage. Relying on this line of analysis, McLachlin J., in
Norberg, would have categorized the defendant physician's sexual
assault of his patient as a breach of fiduciary duty. In M. (K.) v. M.
(H.), a majority of the court held that the defendant father's instigation of an incestuous relationship with the plaintiff daughter constituted not only a battery, but a breach of fiduciary duty.
Even though there might be concurrent claims in contract or tort
in many of these types of situations, the plaintiff nonetheless will
often have a powerful incentive for seeking to invoke equitable
doctrine. The reason for doing so, of course, it is to avoid various
inconveniences thrown up by the common law of contract and tort
or the law of limitations. If, as the court plainly held in Guerin,
equitable compensation is to be calculated on trust principles,
damage awards far in excess of those available for breach of
contract are potentially available. The defaulting "trustee" is subject to the presumption that but for the breach, the beneficiary
would have made the most advantageous investment of the trust
assets possible. The court has also acknowledged the potential
applicability of the principle which holds trustees liable to restore
the trust estate to the same position as it would been in if no breach
had been committed. As is said, "considerations of causation,
foreseeability and remoteness do not readily enter into the matter".76 It was on this basis that the plaintiff in Canson sought to
recover losses in the millions which were not causally linked to the
defendant solicitor's breach of fiduciary duty. In Norberg, the plaintiff sought to invoke fiduciary breach to find a more congenial
analytical context than the tort of battery to consider whether she
had voluntarily consented to the exchange of sexual favours for
76 Dawson (Re); Union Fidelity Trustee Co. Ltd. v. PerpetualTrustee Co. Ltd. (1966), 84
W.N. (Part 1) (N.S.W.) 399 at p. 404, per Street J. quoted with approval by Wilson J. in
Guerin, supra, footnote 11, at p. 360.

Fiduciary Obligation in the Supreme Court of Canada

1997]

131

drugs. In M. (K.) v. M. (H.) the plaintiff sought to avoid the limitations rules that might apply to the action at common law and invoke
the more generous principles relating to equitable claims.
In each of these cases, then, the plaintiff was seeking, in effect,
a modification of a doctrine of the common law through the
construction of a new type of breach of fiduciary obligation and
the awarding of damages or compensation on equitable principles
for the losses flowing from the breach. This line of authority amply
demonstrates that, potentially at least, this reform device has a
rather broad sweep. Unless the decision in Guerin is considered to
be sui generis because of the unusual nature of the relationship
between the federal government and the Indian bands, it is not
obvious why failure to follow instructions would not constitute a
breach of fiduciary obligation when committed by, for example,
an agent or lawyer. Would other kinds of defaults, such as negligence in the conduct of negotiations, constitute a breach of the
fiduciary obligation imposed in Guerin? If so, it is again not
obvious why similar breaches by fiduciaries in other contractual
settings would not be captured by the doctrine. Will the ability of
fiduciary duty to protect the non-economic interests recognized in
M. (K.) v. M. (H.) be extended to other kinds of fiduciary relationships and to other kinds of unlawful conduct? Would a lawyer or
other fiduciary who committed a non-sexual assault or the torts of
conspiracy or defamation be exposed to equitable compensation
for breach of fiduciary duty as an alternative to liability in tort?
Doctrinal conservatives will view this reform potential with
grave misgivings, perhaps horror. Even if one assumes, however,
as I do, that the judiciary generally and the Supreme Court more
particularly bears the burdensome responsibility of reshaping and
adjusting private law doctrine in order to both render it more just
and consistent and to render it more suitable to changing social
and economic conditions, it must be asked whether the invention
of new types of fiduciary duties with respect to which equitable
compensation is to be awarded is the most suitable device for
facilitating such change. There are some considerations, I will
argue, that suggest that the device is one which has some unattractive features.
V.

EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AS LAW REFORMER

Prior to these recent developments one might have said that tort
law is the exclusive body of private law doctrine within which the
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courts have attempted to delineate as best they can, the principles
for imposing liability for compensatory damages arising from unprivileged or wrongful conduct. In these recent cases, there is a
very real sense in which it can be said that the Supreme Court is
in the process of reinventing tort law as equitable compensation
for breach of fiduciary duty. The possibility of overlap between
tort and fiduciary law is, of course, not new. Some breaches of the
traditional fiduciary duties would amount to deceit. Under the
traditional position, however, the form of relief is distinct. The
profits taken by the fiduciary breach would be pursued in equity.
The victim who sought compensatory damages would sue in tort.
Even though equitable compensation for careless misstatement, in
effect, was recognized in Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord), there appears to be little evidence in the law reports of deceit victims suing
for equitable compensation for fiduciary breach in order to avoid
such common law principles as causation, remoteness or foreseeability. In theory, at least, this has now become possible.
If it is true that equitable compensation for fiduciary breach may
come to occupy much of the terrain formerly occupied exclusively
by tort and, moreover, to overlay it with a body of equitable
doctrine, one might ask whether there is any harm in this. If equity
can effect a series of reforms to tort law, it might be suggested, so
much the better. Is this a matter of equity simply reasserting its
historic role of remedying defects in common law doctrine? I
would suggest there are at least three interrelated difficulties.
The first might be referred to as the Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord)
problem. Simply stated, the point is that if the law of torts suffers
from a defect, a reform which applies only to parties in a fiduciary
relationship may offer a very incomplete solution to the problem.
Nocton itself illustrates this difficulty. The historical record
strongly suggests that the Nocton decision"7 represents a conscious
effort by the House of Lords to pull back from the very high
fraud threshold set in Derry v. Peek" for imposing liability for
misstatement. Pollock reported, at the time, that in holding that a
lower threshold would apply to someone with a fiduciary duty, such
as a solicitor, the Lords were going "as near as they dare to saying
[Derry v. Peek] was wrong, as all Lincoln's Inn thought at the
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time".79 As a reform of Derry v. Peek, however, the Nocton holding
is very limited indeed. It applies only to a very particular kind of
misleading statement - a failure to disclose a conflict - in the
context of a very particular kind of relationship. Subject to this
minor qualification, Derry v. Peek served for many more decades as
the law of England for all practical purposes until a more comprehensive adjustment to the common law was effected in Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & PartnersLtd.8
Turning to examples drawn from the recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, if there is a deficiency in the current law of civil
liability for sexual assault, it seems rather unlikely that the problem
can be effectively solved by tinkering with the rules that apply to
sexual assaults committed by individuals who are in the course of
performing a fiduciary undertaking. In Norberg, it was suggested
that the common law of battery was deficient on the consent
point and that the principles for calculating damages were not
sufficiently generous. In M. (K.) v. M. (H.), it was suggested that
the common law limitation doctrines applied unfairly to a case
where the connection between subsequent psychological distress
and the tortious misconduct was only discovered well after the
limitation period expired. With respect to each of these issues, I
would suggest, a reform which developed satisfactory doctrine
only to deal with sexual assaults committed by physicians or
parents and not those committed by more distant relatives,
neighbours and others who have a professional, but not a fiduciary,
relationship to the victim seems inadequate. A more effective
solution than creative application of fiduciary law, then, would be
creative adjustment of the tort principles themselves. It is reassuring, therefore, that the majority in both of these cases apparently
concluded that the reforms advocated on the plaintiff's behalf
could be accommodated by adjustment of the applicable tort principles.
A related concern arises from the fact that the doctrines of
fiduciary law were developed with a different type of liability in
mind than that imposed by the law of tort. The central concern of
fiduciary law, as has been suggested, has been the improper taking
of profits. The liability imposed has been that of lifting those
79 In a letter from Pollock to Holmes in May of 1914 quoted by Gummow, supra, footnote

14 at p. 57. See M. DeWolfe Howe, ed., Holnes-Pollock Letters; the correspondence of
Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932 vol. I (Cambridge, Harvard
U. Press, 1941) atpp. 214-15.
80 [19641 A.C. 465 (H.L.).

134

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 28

profits. The law of torts, of course, imposes liability to compensate
for injuries sustained as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct. It is one thing, I would suggest, to require someone to
disgorge profits they have acquired in an unattractive way, quite
another to impose on an individual liability to, in effect, insure the
risk of injuries sustained by another. It may be very disappointing
indeed to be stripped of one's profits. The imposition of liability
in damages for tortious wrongdoing, of course, may be simply
ruinous. The difference in the nature of the liability imposed in the
two different categories of obligation may help to explain why it
is that the duties imposed in fiduciary law appear to be more
onerous and exacting than those imposed by the law of torts.
Cardozo C.J. emphasized the strictness of the standard imposed on
fiduciaries colourfully in Meinhard v. Salmon8 in the following
terms :82
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honour the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behaviour. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions.... Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.

Again, lifting dishonourable profits is a very different matter from
imposing an obligation to act as an insurer of another's losses.
Duties designed with one type of liability in mind may not serve
us well when considering whether another and much more comprehensive or burdensome form of liability should be imposed.
A similar difficulty arises from the suggestion that appears to
have been taken seriously, though not yet clearly acted upon by
the majority of the court in any case other than Guerin, that the
calculation of compensatory damages for breach of fiduciary duty
is to be made on the basis of equitable principles. These would
operate more generously to the plaintiff than common law rules
relating to such matters as causation, foreseeability, mitigation and
the like. If, as I have suggested above, there is a potential mismatch
between the duties developed in fiduciary law and the awarding of
compensatory damages, this difficulty is further aggravated by an
approach of this kind. I appreciate, of course, that express trustees
81 249 N.Y. 458 (C.A. 1928).
82

Ibid. at p. 464.
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are subject both to high and exacting standards and to compensatory damages calculated on the more generous equitable basis. It
may be argued, then, that this approach can simply be extended by
analogy to non-trustee fiduciaries. The answer must be that as
the fiduciary task or role and responsibilities of the non-trustee
fiduciary begin to look less and less like that of an express trustee,
the analogy may well break down. Indeed, with the non-trustee
fiduciary, the imposition of the trustee-like liability for compensatory damages may well appear to be draconian and may well create
pressure on the courts to restrict the application of the fiduciary
label more narrowly than it has been in the past. I have already
suggested that this force appears to be at work in the dissenting
opinion in the Hodgkinson case.
In short, as a means of reforming the law of tort, equitable
compensation is likely to produce only incomplete and cramped
reform. It runs the risk of mismatching duty and remedy, all the
more so if the compensatory damages for breach of fiduciary duty
are to be calculated in the manner in which liability is imposed
upon the express trustee. Further, these developments carry with
them the risk that the notion of fiduciary relationship may shrink
in order to avoid the imposition of draconian remedies on individuals who might otherwise have been subject to fiduciary duties
relating to the taking of improper profits.
Finally, one might suggest that a reform methodology which
rests simply on the invocation of equity runs the risk of avoiding
an obligation to engage in the kind of confrontation with the
doctrines and policies of common law that would be entailed in a
direct overruling. Thus, if the law of torts represents the collective
best attempt of the judiciary to fashion principles for defining
circumstances in which one person should serve as an insurer of
another's losses, a strategy that requires direct overruling of the
old doctrine may have some advantages. It would force the courts
to articulate very carefully their critique of the existing doctrine
and the policy rationale underlining the proposed reform. If our
courts are, however, to proceed by way of developing new doctrines through the device of equitable compensation for breach of
fiduciary duty, it may be very important for them to follow the
approach advocated by La Forest J. in Canson to the effect that in
developing the principles of equitable compensation, the courts
should have due regard to the principles of common law.
Similar points can be made with respect to the prospects for
equitable compensation for fiduciary breach serving as a fruitful
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device for the reform of the law of contracts. Again, the possibility
of concurrent liability or overlap between fiduciary obligation and
contract is not new. Many traditional breaches of fiduciary duty such as non-disclosure of a conflict by a solicitor - would constitute both a breach of fiduciary duty and a breach of the contract
to provide professional service at a reasonable standard. Under
traditional doctrine, however, fiduciary duty would be resorted to
only to recover the ill-gotten gains. If the client suffered loss as a
result of the breach of duty, a claim would be advanced for contractual breach. As Hodgkinson demonstrates, however, the new development is that the courts may be confronted with a series of claims
in which the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for breach of
fiduciary duty in the hope that they might be calculated on the
trust rather than the contract model. If the doctrines of equitable
compensation are to be developed in response to deficiencies in
the law of contracts, the reform effected is likely to be an incomplete one. Again, though it may well be that the law of contract
would be improved by a greater embrace of equitable notions, it is
nonetheless true that it is within the conceptual construct of the
law of contracts that the courts have attempted to think carefully
about the principles by which liability should be imposed to compensate a promisee for injuries resulting from the promisor's failure to carry out an undertaking. Accordingly, a careful examination
of the policy and principles underlying the common law rules
would appear to be a desirable prelude to the development of
markedly different principles for calculating equitable damages
for breach of undertakings by fiduciaries.
VI.

TOWARD A LESS EXPANSIVE READING

If one accepts the thesis advanced here - that this line of
authority, if extended to its logical extremes, is capable of effecting
dramatic and potentially unattractive reform - it may be asked
whether a less expansive reading of these cases is possible. The
answer to this question, in my view, is affirmative. I have argued
above 3 that there is an apparent consensus of the court on definitional matters which reflects a rather traditional view of the definition of fiduciary relationship. The less orthodox views pertain to the
growing list of types of fiduciary duties and the expanding use of
equitable compensation or damages for breach. As has been argued
83
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above,84 it is within this context that the growth of fiduciary law and
the possibility of cramped or incomplete reform of the doctrines of
tort and contract appear to lie. If one examines the results of the
cases, however, it may be thought that these prospects are more
theoretical than real. In none of the decided cases, apart from McInerney and Guerin, does the court achieve a result which is linked
only to an expanded view of fiduciary duty or equitable compensation. In Hodgkinson, for example, the result was held by the majority
to rest not only on breach of fiduciary duty but on a valid claim for
damages for breach of contract. In Norberg and M. (K.) v. M. (H.)
the results were warranted, in the majority view, on the basis of both
fiduciary analysis and the law of tort. In Canson, Lac and Frame,
the claim for breach of fiduciary obligation did not enjoy success.
In the main then, the results of these cases do not demonstrate that
equitable compensation for fiduciary breach is in fact being utilized
by the court to overhaul existing principles of the law of contract
and tort.
The two cases - Mclnerney and Guerin - which adopt novel
approaches might be considered to be sui generis. The first deals
with the rather particular problem of disclosure of health information and may not be considered to create, in effect, a new access
to information scheme for private sector fiduciaries. In Guerin, the
unique history of the relationship between the federal government
and aboriginal groups, together with the trustee-like role of the
former in dealing with the property of the latter, may be thought
to create a special need for creative intervention by the courts not
present or not present to the same degree in other contexts.
The results of these cases thus offer little support for the view
that fiduciary law is trampling out of control through well-kept
gardens of the common law of contract and tort. Nonetheless, it
may be asked whether, at the level of general principle, the court
has adopted a new and more muscular version of the role to be
played by equitable principles in effecting reform in these areas.
As I have attempted to demonstrate, of course, support for the
view that this has occurred can be drawn from the opinions of the
court, both majority and dissenting, in these cases. Again, however,
the proof is arguably to be found in the pudding and there is not
yet much evidence that equitable compensation will play an overly
dramatic role of this kind. Moreover, it is of some significance that
in Canson, La Forest J., in considering whether to apply principles
84 See part IV, supra.
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different from those of the common law in imposing liability for
equitable compensation, suggested that courts should accord some
deference to the principles of common law. Although this view
was said to rest upon the fusion of common law and equity,85 it is
evident from La Forest J.'s reasoning in M. (K.) v. M. (H.) that it is
his view that equity has a continuing traditional role to play in
softening the sharp edges of the common law. Although it is true
that the dissenting opinion of McLachlin J. in Canson offers a
more insular and, perhaps, ambitious view of equity's role, she also
conceded that the court should "take wisdom where we can find it
and accept such insights offered by the law of tort, in particular
deceit, as may prove useful."8 6 In short, it is possible to read these
opinions as support for the view that the court will not lightly use
expanded doctrines of equity to set aside common law doctrine
without carefully examining its wisdom or, presumably, lack of
same.
Finally, we should note that there is little evidence thus far that
a majority of the court, at least, has fallen into the trap of what has
been referred to above as the Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord) problem.87 That is to say, there is no majority opinion which appears to
attempt to reform tort or contract principles through use of fiduciary
doctrine with the result that the reform in question is artificially
restricted to the fiduciary context. There were two cases -Hodgkinson and Norberg88 - in which the dissentients felt that a result
favourable to the plaintiff could not be achieved at common law. In
each case, however, the majority held that an (arguably) innovative
interpretation of the applicable common law rule would achieve this
result. Similarly, in M. (K.) v. M. (H.)89 reform of the limitations
rules relating to damages for incest or sexual assault were not limited
by the majority to cases of fiduciary breach.
In summary, though it is doubtless the case, in my view, that
this line of authority contains within it the doctrinal seeds from
which a rather unruly version of fiduciary law could grow, a careful
reading of these cases that places emphasis on actual results and on
the approach to doctrinal modification manifest in these opinions
supports a less apocalyptic view.
Sed quaere. See P. Perell, "The Aftermath of Fusion: Canson Enterprises Ltd. v.
Boughton & Co." (1993), 14 Adv. Q. 488.
86 [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534 at pp. 545-56.
87 See supra, part V.
88 Both supra, footnotes 8 and 19.
89 Supra, footnote 25.
85
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Translating this less expansive reading into practical analytical
steps, one might suggest the following. Where a court finds the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, the plaintiff will be entitled to strip the defendant fiduciary of profits
secured by breach through the traditional remedies of constructive
trust and an accounting of profits. Where the plaintiff seeks damages or equitable compensation for fiduciary breach, however,
some additional analysis may be appropriate. Where this claim is
being pursued in order to avoid an inconvenient rule of the law of
contract or tort, it would be appropriate to hold that rule up to
scrutiny and examine its underlying wisdom or lack of same. If
the current tort or contract rule lacks a sound foundation, a court
minded to modify the doctrine could take either one of two steps.
First, if the problematic aspect of the rule is of general application
(i.e., not restricted to situations in which the parties happen to have
a fiduciary relationship), one might, perhaps should, deploy the
traditional methods of the common law to effect a modification of
the rule of tort or contract in issue. This approach avoids the
Nocton v. Ashburton (Lord) problem.
If, on the other hand, the problem is one which is quite particular
to the fiduciary context, one would deploy the traditional principles
of equity to determine whether the imposition of damages relief in
equity effects a sound and just result, notwithstanding the fact that
a similar result does not obtain in contract or tort. In passing,
however, one might suggest that when determining the nature of
equitable compensatory relief for breach of fiduciary duty, it is
perhaps not entirely obvious why one should invariably ignore
such common law concepts as reasonable foreseeability. ° Surely,
the question in such a case is whether the policy considerations
giving rise to this limitation in contract and tort should be considered
to be present in the particular fiduciary context. In order to accommodate Guerin, however, one might add that as the fact situation in
issue approaches more closely the factual circumstances of an express trust, the applicable principles of trust law for imposing liability for damages on the express trustee may be appropriately invoked.
An analytical method rather like the foregoing is implicit if not
explicit in the reasoning of La Forest J. in Canson. It is not deeply
inconsistent or perhaps not inconsistent at all with the approach
adopted by McLachlin J. in that case or in Norberg or M. (K.) v.
M. (H.) where it was her view that the fiduciary nature of the
90 Cf. the dictum of Street J. in Dawson (Re) quoted, supra, at footnote 76.
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relationship should lead to a different approach to remedial questions. By such analytical means, I would suggest, equitable compensation could provide an effective instrument of doctrinal reform
without, at the same time, unattractively destabilizing vast areas
of contract and tort.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The reader who is unfamiliar with this recent line of authorities
is likely to find them impressive, but at the same time perhaps, a
bit unsettling. Cumulatively, the opinions rendered in these cases
offer an extraordinarily rich analytical resource. At every turn, it
seems, one is plunged into sophisticated analysis of important and
often fundamental issues. At the same time, the cumulative effect
appears to be one of introducing a degree of instability into the
analysis of fiduciary issues. One can certainly make the case for a
prometheus unbound thesis. It is indeed possible that judges working with these materials could further develop equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty as a device which would eclipse
contract and tort in a variety of commercial settings. I have tried
to suggest, however, that a more cautious approach is both desirable and consistent with the views taken by the majority of the
court on most occasions. With respect to the definition of fiduciary
obligation, I have suggested that the views of the Hodgkinson
plurality and the Lac majority, though they are differently composed, are not only very similar in principle but quite orthodox in
their rendering of the fiduciary concept. The discussions of equitable compensation, of course, harbour greater potential for dramatic
reform. At this stage, however, it should be noted that apart from
Guerin, which might be viewed as sui generis, the majority of the
court in each of the leading cases has adopted the view that the
result achieved was not dependent on resort to equitable compensation doctrine. However, in at least three of those cases - Norberg,
M. (K.) v. M. (H.) and Hodgkinson itself- this result was achieved
only by effecting what would appear to-be a modification of the
prior common law doctrine in the direction favoured by those who
sought to rely on equitable principles.
While it thus remains unclear whether fiduciary duty, and more
particularly, equitable compensation will become an explicit and
powerful vehicle for the reform of common law doctrine, it seems
rather likely that each will have a continuing covert, and, one
hopes, beneficial influence.

